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Abstract 
Ethiopia has an ethnical federal system that is based on the assumption that the 
ethno-linguistic communities of the country are located in neatly defined, or 
definable, territorial areas. On the basis of this assumption the federal system 
aspires to accommodate the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people through, 
principally, if not exclusively, territorial schemes. This assumption is, however, 
incorrect as far as urban areas are concerned which, despite being territorially 
enclosed within one of the ethnic-based regions or sub-regional units, have 
thousands of multi-ethnic dwellers. The territorial scheme thus fails to cater to a 
large contingent of multi-ethnic urban dwellers. 
 
Introduction 
States with population of diverse ethnic or cultural identities use territorial and non-
territorial methods for managing the diversity of their population. The territorial 
management of diversity, which takes different forms, including federalism or 
regionalism, presupposes the recognition of a certain territorial area as an 
autonomous sub-national unit of a particular identity group. This method has been 
adopted for managing diversity or accommodating minorities in multiethnic and 
multi-lingual states such as Ethiopia, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium and the like. 
 
The territorial method of managing diversity, however, fails to cater for urban 
popu- lation, which is often ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous. Cities are 
built around ‘economic logic’ rather than cultural affinity or ‘political legitimacy through 
ethnic mem- bership’, making them multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
(Qadeer, 1997). Thus, states that use territorial methods for managing diversity are 
often faced with the risk of marginalising minorities living in urban areas within 
ethnically structured sub- national units. This is the case, for instance, in Canada 
where the recognition of Quebec as the autonomous region of the French-speaking 
community came at the risk of marginalising the English-speaking community living 
in cities such as Montreal and Quebec City (Vaillancourt, Coche, Cadieux, & Ronson, 
2012). In Spain, the accommodation of diverse linguistic communities in cities such 
as Barcelona (the capital of the autonomous regions of Catalonia), Vitoria-Gasteiz 
(the capital of Basque Country) and Santiago de Compostela (the capital of Galicia) 
is often at issue. Belgium faces similar challenges in Brussels, the capital of the 
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country, which, despite being territorially enclosed within the Dutch- speaking 
Flemish region, has majority French-speaking and minority Dutch-speaking 
residents, not to mention the non-European immigrant community (Deschouwer, 
2005). 
 
Yet, there is a growing demand for access to urban life, as captured in ‘The Right to the 
City’, that guarantees the full usufruct of the city, respecting diversity and preserving 
the cultural memory and identity of all citizens free of discrimination. ‘The right to the 
city’, as initially conceptualised by the French Philosopher Henri Lefebvre, was a call 
for the ‘subordination of the economic function of the city’ to its ‘social function’. He was 
concerned about the increasing ‘commodification’ of urban spaces that undermined the 
role of the city as a public space and cite of ‘social and political life, wealth, knowledge 
and arts’ where differences thrive. Lefebvre thus called for the return of the 
predominance of the social function of the city, which must allow the participation 
(enfranchisement) of the ordinary people in how their homes and cities are shaped 
(Huchzermeyer, 2014). Participation as conceived by Lefebvre is not simply taking part 
in the framing of urban policies through, for instance, electoral processes or civic 
engagements.  It is rather focused the participation on all decisions and processes 
that produce urban space (Purcell, 2002). 
 
The concept of ‘the right to the city’ has now evolved to encompass a wide range of 
political and  socio-economic,  cultural  and  environmental  rights,  which  are  
recognised in various international instruments and, now, are captured in the ‘World 
Charter on the Right of the Cities’. At the centre of the right to the city, as provided in 
the Charter, is the recognition of all residents of a city, including those residing in the 
city provisionally, their ethnic or other identities regardless, as citizens of the city (Art 1 
(5)). As citizens, all inhabitants of a city have the ‘equitable usufruct’ of the city on the 
basis of ‘sustainability, democracy, equity, and social justice’ (Art 1(2)). The right to 
participate of all of the citizens of the city in its political, social and cultural life is thus 
the corner stone of the right of the city. The participation in the political life includes 
the right to participate in local elections both as a voter and a candidate based on the 
principle of equality. Ensuring political ‘enfranchisement and social inclusion’, and 
preventing disenfranchisement and social exclusion, are the aspirations proponents of 
the right  to  the  city  hope  to  achieve.  As hinted above, the right to the city is 
principally based on the recognition of the equal citizenship of all individual residents 
of the city. It does, however, envisage that certain ethnic or social groups may also be 
catered for through affirmative actions (Art 2(4)(2)). The cultural aspect of the right to 
the city requires the preservation of the ‘cultural memories and identities’ of all citizens 
of a city (Art 1 (1)). 
 
The right to the city is not a legal right, nor is it part of human rights regimes. 
However, it is viewed as a ‘compelling approach’ that embodies legitimate demands for 
the fulfillment of the essential conditions that are critical for ensuring that 
individual citizens and social and cultural groups residing in the city have ‘dignified and 
secure existence’ (Huch- zermeyer, 2014). 
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In this article, it is argued that the institutional and political design of cities in 
Ethiopia falls short of the standard required to guarantee urban dwellers the full 
usufruct of the Ethiopian city. In the course of this argument, the paper first 
identifies the place of cities in Ethiopia’s federal arrangement. It then shows how 
and why cities in Ethiopia have ethnically diverse population. The paper then deals 
with the issue of whether and how the regional states respond to the ethnic diversity 
of cities within their jurisdiction in terms of political representation, language and 
education before offers some final conclusions. 
 
Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system and the place of cities in it 
Managing the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people is an explicitly stated purpose of 
the country’s federal system. The right to self-determination of every ethnic 
community of the country being its foundational principle, Ethiopia’s federal system 
is often viewed as a ‘federation of ethnic groups’ in which the various ethnic 
communities are ‘joined together in a federal union’, and, thus, Ethiopia as a state 
‘founded by and belong[ing] to all ethnic groups’ (Gebre-Sellasie, 2003; FDRE 
Constitution, 1995 Preamble & Art 39; Herther– Spiro, 2007). 
 
The notion of ethnicity under Ethiopia’s federal Constitution is linked to a specific 
territory based on the supposition that every ethnic community is, or can be, linked to 
a neatly defined, or definable, territorial area, wherein it is considered an 
autochthonous community. On the basis of this assumption, Article 39 (5) of the 
Constitution defines an ethnic community, among other things, by the notion of 
inhabiting ‘an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory’. Based on the same 
supposition, the Constitution also uses territorial schemes for accommodating the 
ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people (Fiseha, 2007).1 Accordingly nine regional 
states—demarcated largely along ethnic lines—have been established as constituent 
units of the federation.2 Some 25 ethnic local government units, which take the 
form of either a liyu-woreda (special district) or a nationality zone (special zone), 
have also been established in five of the nine regions with a view to territorially 
accommodating intra-regional ethnic minorities3 (Ayele & Fessha, 2012). 
 
Within these ethnically structured regional and sub-regional units, there are 
about 925 urban areas that are categorised as cities or municipalities: more than 
820 of the 925 urban settlements are municipalities while the rest are cities 
(Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MWUD), 2007).  The autonomy of the 
city approximates that of the woreda, the autonomous local government unit 
established in rural areas. The municipality, on the other hand, serves as an 
administrative level of the woreda and provides residents with municipal services. 
In terms of the country’s federal system, regulation of and oversight over cities and 
municipalities is the competence of the ethnic-based regional states and sub-
regional units (Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia [FDRE] Constitution (1995) 
Art 50 (4)). 
 
Cities and ethnic diversity in Ethiopia 
As mentioned above, Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federal system assumes that the 
various ethno-linguistic communities of the country are located in distinct territorial 
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areas, forming the autochthonous communities of the areas. This assumption is 
generally accurate as far as the rural areas are concerned which are often ethnically 
homogenous.4 It is, however, inaccurate with respect to hundreds of cities and 
municipalities which have ethnically diverse population. 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, there are millions of urban dwellers living in cities outside the 
regions or sub-regions where the ethnic communities to which they belong are 
considered autochthonous. 
 
 
 
Over three million non-Oromo people reside in many cities of the Oromia region. As 
can be seen in the table, the non-Oromos are in majority in major cities such as 
Adama and Bishoftu that are found in the Oromia region. The Amharas and 
Oromos together constitute about 70% of the residents of Awassa of Benishangul-
Gumuz. Further- more, in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) half a 
million Amharas and quarter of a million of Oromos are found, mostly in the 
urban areas of the SNNP, in addition to members of other communities. Tens of 
thousands of Oromos, Amharas and others belonging to various ethnic communities 
also live in Gambella and Benishangul- Gumuz regions (Population Census 
Commission, 2008). The cities in northern Ethiopia (the Amhara and Tigray regions) 
are also ethnically heterogeneous.  Gonder, a city located in the Amhara region, 
has a large number of Tigrayans while Mekele, the capital of Tigray, has a 
significant number of Amharas. As Table 1 shows, the cities in the southern regions 
(Oromia, SNNP, Gambella and Benishangul) are much more ethnically diverse than 
those in the north, since, as explained below, the population movement in Ethiopia, 
especially in the past one and half century, has been mainly from the north to the 
south. The ethnic diversity in the Ethiopian cities, especially those in the south, and 
the political quandaries that it poses, can be explained with reference to historical 
and economic realities. 
 
The emergence of many of the cities in Ethiopia is linked to the emergence of ‘Modern 
Ethiopia’ in the late nineteenth century (Tibebu, 1995). Indeed the five regions of 
the Abyssinian Empire—the Tigre (in the present day Tigray and Eritrea), Gojjam, 
Wollo, Gonder (Begemidir) and Showa—had various historical urban settlements, 
such as Gonder, Axum, Debre Berhan, which, depending on the region controlling 
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the central throne, served as seats of the imperial government (Fiseha, 2007).5 
There were also several historical cities, such as Harer and Jimma, in the 
southern half of the country the establishment of which preceded the emergence of 
‘Modern Ethiopia’. However, the establishment of most of the cities in the 
southern regions is associated with the territorial expansion of the Abyssinian 
Empire that brought about ‘Modern Ethiopia’ (Markakis, 1975; Tibebu, 1995; 
Zewide, 2002). 
 
Undertaken in the name of nation building, the territorial expansion culminated 
under Emperor Menilik II (1989 – 1913) in the late 1890s, followed by decades of 
centralisation under Emperor Haile Sellasie (Zewide, 2002). The territorial 
expansion was mostly carried out through brute force even though in some cases 
diplomacy secured Menilik the peaceful submission to his authority of some of 
the regional and local rulers of southern Ethiopia. This had unfavourable political, 
economic and cultural consequences for the communities in the areas. In the areas 
that were militarily overpowered, settlement sites and military garrisons were 
established for the soldiers, administrators and priests who moved to the areas 
from northern Ethiopia. Over two-thirds of the lands in these regions were 
expropriated and re-assigned to the settlers (Tibebu, 1995). Moreover, the Emperor 
personally appointed regional and local rulers to the areas, often from among his 
own military leaders, thereby abolishing the traditional authorities and institutions 
of the southern regions, except where the latter were necessary for exerting control 
over the local communities (Abbink, 1998). The communities in these regions were 
encour- aged, if not coerced, to abandon their languages and adopted the language, 
culture and even religion of the communities of northern Ethiopia (Markakis, 2004). 
 
The garrison towns, which were so established, began to serve as political and 
admin- istrative centres wherefrom the centrally appointed rulers of the localities 
exercised control over the communities of the areas. These settlements, eventually, 
grew to be towns and cities that we know now (Tibebu, 1995). It is, therefore, in 
such rather infelicitous context that Addis Ababa and most of the cities, in the 
southern regions, happened to emerge as multi-ethnic urban settlements from the 
very beginning. 
 
Despite the unhappy context that gave rise to their existence, most of the cities in 
southern Ethiopia have now become important political and economic centres. 
Millions of people have moved to these cities from within the southern regions and 
from the north- ern regions, for reasons that are completely unrelated to the 
territorial expansion of the old empire, and have accumulated properties, married 
and inter-married with local residents and established families (Wagaw, 1999). 
Now most of the urban residents of northern origin who live in the southern 
regions are second-, third- or even fourth-generation migrants, having little or no 
connection with the northern regions. Moreover, the urban residents who are 
autochthonous to the regions have formed a distinct identity as a conse- quence of 
living in urban areas. Furthermore, there are a large number of urban residents with 
mixed ethnic origins (Abbink, 1998). 
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Economic realities have also contributed to the ethnic diversity of the urban 
population in Ethiopia. For centuries, individuals belonging to various ethnic 
communities moved from their homelands to other parts of the country in 
pursuit of economic interests. Take, for example, the Gurage, Silte and Wolayita, 
ethnic communities of southern origin. Each has its own nationality zone in the 
SNNP. However, these nationality zones are overpopulated resulting in members 
of these communities migrating to urban areas elsewhere in order to engage in 
business activities (Vaughn, 2003).6 The result has been the emergence of large 
Gurage, Silte and Wolayita communities in cities and municipalities outside of 
‘their’ nationality zones or liyu woredas, both within and outside the SNNP. Thus, 
as Table 1shows, the Gurages are the third largest community in Adama (Nazret), a 
city that is located in Oromia. Likewise, the Oromos constitute the second largest 
community in the city of Gambella, the capital of the Gambella regional state. 
 
The above trend is set to intensify, as Ethiopia becomes an increasingly urbanised 
country as indicated in Table 1. 
 
Ethiopia is urbanising at the rate of 4%, outstripping the average urbanisation rate of 
the African continent, which stands at 3.2% (MoWUD, 2007). This continues to 
make cities even more ethnically diverse as people of different ethnic origin move 
from rural to urban areas. The role of cities as hosts of federal and state governments 
organs such as univer- sities and offices of federal ministries further contributes 
to the diversification. For example, 21 new universities, in addition to the already 
existing 11universities, have been established in cities and towns across the 
country (Addis Fortune, 2015). Indeed the universities are established with the 
purpose of bringing higher education institutions within geographical proximity of 
marginalised communities and addressing historic injus- tices (Semela, 2008). Yet, 
these are federal institutions, governed by federal laws, and which, both in terms of 
the country’s higher education policy and the practice, accept and serve students of 
all ethnic backgrounds. The instructors and students in the univer- sities are thus by 
and large from diverse ethnic communities, even though the majority of the 
academic stuff, especially those in leadership position, are often from the autochtho- 
nous communities of the cities or regions where the universities are situated (See 
Adamu, 2014). These institutions are thus likely to deepen the ethnic diversification 
of their host cities. 
 
Cities and non-autochthonous communities; political and cultural 
inclusion 
As mentioned above, the establishment of the Ethiopian federal system is 
predicated on undoing past political and economic marginalisation of the various 
ethnic communities of the country, in particular those in the southern regions, 
principally through territorial methods. Yet the fates of the cities that are enclosed 
in the ethnic territories have been a cause of incessant debate beginning from the 
transitional period (1991 – 1995). 
 
As it is clear from the discussion above, the history that is associated with the 
emergence of the cities in the southern regions is far from rosy. The very existence of 
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the cities is a direct result of the physical and cultural dislocations of the original 
inhabitants of the areas where the cities are found. The ethnic communities within 
whose territorial areas the cities are enclosed, therefore, claim historical rights on the 
lands on which the cities are estab- lished and seek to exercise full political control 
over the cities. On the other hand there are those who contend that the cities should 
be organised as autonomous political units outside the jurisdiction of the ethnic-based 
regional and sub-regional units (Abreham, 1994). They argue that the cities can no 
longer be ‘claimed to be “native ethnic areas” of any group except in an anachronistic, 
nominal sense’ (Abbink, 1998). During the drafting of the 1995 Constitution there 
was heated debate between the proponents of the above two pos- itions. In the end 
those who were in favour undoing past injustices and allowing ethnic communities 
full political control over the cities within their territorial areas prevailed. 
 
The exceptions are Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, the two federal cities. Addis Ababa is 
the seat of the federal government, with its own government and outside of the 
jurisdiction of an ethnic regional unit, even if Oromia’s ‘special interest’ in the city, 
which is yet to be defined, is given constitutional recognition (FDRE Constitution, 
1995) Art 49 1 & 2). Both the Somali and Oromia regions claim jurisdiction over Dire 
Dawa—the second largest and cosmopolitan city in Ethiopia. At least for now, this 
city is an autonomous city under the federal government (FDRE Proclamation No. 
416 (2004) Preamble). 
 
The political arrangement that puts ethnically diverse urban areas under 
ethnically organised regional and sub-regional units has significant political and 
cultural implications to those residents of the cities not belonging to the dominant 
ethnic community of the regions or sub-region. The question is whether and how 
the ethnic territories have balanced the need to correct historical injustices that the 
respective communities suffered with the right to the cities of urban dwellers not 
belonging to the autochthonous ethnic communities, in particular, in terms of 
political representation, language and education. 
 
Political Participation 
There are two reasons why the ethnic federal construct of Ethiopia has important 
conse- quences for the political representation of individuals of diverse ethnic 
background resid- ing in a city that is enclosed within an ethnic territory. 
 
First, the establishment of the regional states and the ethnic sub-regional units, 
within which all the cities, except the two federal cities, are located, is based on the 
postulate that such arrangement allows a national minority group to become a  regional 
or  local majority (Fessha, 2010). The creation of such territorial unit is, therefore, 
designed and expected to allow the particular group to enjoy a certain degree of 
political autonomy. This naturally impacts the political fate of ‘others’ within such a 
regional or sub-regional unit.  Secondly,  a  regional  state  has  the  power  to  regulate  
certain  aspects  of  political representation and democratic participation at intra-
regional level, including, therefore, in the cities within its jurisdiction. The federal 
electoral law, for instance, allows the regional states to determine the number of seats 
a city council may have and the number and bound- aries of the electoral 
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constituencies for local council elections (Art 29 (2), Proclamation 532/2007). A 
region can thus use these powers to expand or limit the political represen- tation of 
urban dwellers of non-autochthonous ethnic background in those cities. 
 
As part of the federal scheme that seeks to address the historical marginalisation, 
members of the ethnic communities within whose territories the cities are found 
are expected to gain adequate representation in, and exercise a dominant control over, 
the pol- itical structures of the cities (Van der Beken, 2014). This is not likely to 
materialise through the normal electoral process since members of the 
autochthonous communities are in the minority in many cities of the southern 
region. This calls for an institutional arrangement that ensures members of such 
communities are in control of the cities’ pol- itical structures. In the absence of such 
institutional arrangement, the autonomous communities run the risk of being 
outvoted on major issues concerning the cities. This indeed ‘would run contrary to 
the rationale behind the establishment of ethnic-based territories’ (Van der Beken, 
2014). Addressing historical issues should not, however, result in the complete 
disenfranchisement of the urban residents with non-autochthonous ethnic back- 
ground since this will excessively compromise their right to the city. The question 
is whether and how the ethnic-based regional states or sub-regional units seek to 
balance the need to ensure the dominance of the autochthonous communities with 
responding to the ethnic diversity of the people living in the cities. 
 
The regional states have created various political structures for the cities within 
their jurisdictions, including city councils and mayoral offices. The southern 
regions, such as Oromia, SNNP and Benishangul-Gumuz, have  also  introduced  
affirmative  measures that are meant to address historical marginalisation and 
enhance the political represen- tation in the cities of members of the autochthonous 
communities. The northern regions (Amhara and Tigray) have not introduced such 
a system presumably because the emer- gence of the cities in these regions, unlike 
those in the southern regions, was not a result of the displacement of the 
autochthonous communities and that the latter are in majority in all of the cities in 
these two regions. 
 
The institutional schemes that are so introduced in the southern regions include a 
quota system that reserves a portion of the seats of the city councils and some or all 
of the pos- itions in the city executives. In some sense, this arrangement flows from 
a national law, which expressly provides that a certain percentage of the seats in a 
local council may be reserved for a local ethnic minority (Proclamation 7/1992). In 
SNNP, for instance, up to 30% of the seats in a city council are reserved for 
members of the autochthonous ethnic communities of the relevant nationality zone 
or liyu woreda within whose jurisdic- tion the city administration is situated. Rural 
communities adjacent to the cities may vote to elect representatives into the city 
council in order to fill the seats that are reserved for the autochthonous ethnic 
communities (SNNP Proclamation 103/2006 Art 16 (3) (1)). This configuration is 
applied in particular to cities where members of the autochthonous ethnic 
communities are in the minority and as long as they remain so. In Oromia up to 
50% of the seats in all city councils are reserved for members of the Oromo ethnic 
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com- munity. In addition, 20% of a city council’s seats are reserved for 
representatives of the rural communities adjacent to the city, which are often 
predominantly ethnic Oromo. Voters who reside outside the boundaries of the 
cities are thus allowed to vote in city council  elections,  arguably  to  ensure  that  
the  Oromos  dominate  the  council  (ORS Proclamation 65, 2003 Art 13(3)). 
Likewise, the City Proclamation of Benishangul- Gumuz regional state also 
reserves seats for autochthonous ethnic communities: 55% of a city council in the 
region is reserved for autochthonous ethnic communities. The regional legislature 
retains the power to increase this percentage (BGRS Proclamation 69 (2007) Art 10 
(5)). 
 
The reservation of political positions for autochthonous communities also extends to 
the executive branch of the city government. A mayor of a city in SNNP may be 
elected only from among the members of the city council belonging to the 
autochthonous ethnic com- munity within whose nationality zone or liyu woreda the 
city is found (SNNP Proclama- tion 103/2006 Art 21(1) (2)). A city resident with a 
non-autochthonous ethnic background may thus not be a mayor of a city, no matter 
how long he or she may have resided in that particular city. Consequently, cities 
such as Wolkite´  and Butajira—that are located in Gurage Nationality Zone—can 
have mayors hailing from only the Gurage community. Likewise only an individual 
belonging to the Hadiya community can be a mayor of Hosanna, a city located 
within the Hadiya Nationality Zone. The same applies to the other mono-ethnic 
nationalities zones. 
 
In Oromia, the mayor and deputy-mayor of a city were elected by the city council from 
among its members. However, in 2006, this was changed to empower the Regional 
President to make the appointment of mayors to all cities in the region (ORS 
Proclamation 116/2006 Art 2 (6)). As the preamble of the amendment law indicates, 
the change was necessary in order to eliminate all legislative hurdles that limited ‘the 
role of the Oromo people’ in the cities. In another words, this must ensure that 
Oromos occupy all political organs of the cities, including the offices of the mayor and 
the deputy-mayor. 
 
The requirement proficiency in the working language of a regional state or an 
ethnic sub-regional unit is the other institutional measure that is meant to enhance 
the political representation of hitherto marginalised communities. This requirement 
indeed does not emanate from regional laws but from national legislation, which 
provides that candidates for elections should be conversant with the working 
language of the regional state or sub-regional unit and has nationwide application 
(Proclamation 532/2003 Art 45(1) (b)). 
 
As will be discussed below, each regional state, nationality zone or liyu woreda is 
authorised to adopt its own working language and cities are generally expected to 
use the working language of the regional state or the ethnic-based sub-regional 
unit within whose jurisdiction they are found. It is therefore not sufficient for a 
candidate who seeks to run for a city council membership to be conversant with the 
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working language of the regional government. He or she is also required to command 
the working language of the relevant city administration. 
 
As it is clear from the above, addressing historical injustice and enhancing the 
political representation, indeed the political dominance, of members of the 
autochthonous communities have been given considerable attention in the design of 
the political structures of the cities in the southern regions. One may argue that in 
some cases the balance between addressing historical injustice and catering to the 
ethnic diversity of the residents of the cities has been struck. For instance, in SNNP 
the reservation of 30% of the seats in a city council for members of autochthonous 
communities ensures that the latter are fairly represented. It also leaves 70% of the 
seats in the council to be contested for by everyone residing in the cities, including 
members of the autochthonous communities. Even  the  reservation  of  55%  of  the  
seats  of  a  city  council  for  the  autochthonous communities of Benishangul-Gumuz 
can be viewed as a scheme that ensures that the autochthonous communities have 
dominant presence in the political structures of the cities without totally excluding 
residents of the cities of non-autochthonous ethnic background from political 
representation. 
 
However in some cases, the institutional measures discussed above, coupled with 
the political practice, go beyond ensuring that the autochthonous ethnic 
communities dominate the cities’ political structures. They rather have the effect of 
completely excluding those urban dwellers with non-autochthonous ethnic 
background from any representation in the cities’ political structures. For instance 
Proclamation 65/2003 (Art 13 (3 & 4)) of the Oromia regional state reserved a 
maximum of 30% of the seats in a city council in Oromia for ethnic Oromos and 5% of 
the seats for the rural kebeles that are found in the vicinity of a city, an arrangement 
that could have struck a balance between addressing historical issues and the right 
to the city of the non-Oromo residents of the cities in Oromia. This was, however, 
changed when Proclamation 116/2006 was issued that reserved 70% of the seats in 
a city council for ethnic Oromos. Now not even a single member of the councils of the 
cities of Bishoftu and Ambo of Oromia is a non-Oromo (Amensisa, 2012). 
Moreover, as was mentioned above, the Benishangul-Gumuz regional council 
retains the power to increase the seats that are reserved for the autochthonous 
communities of the region. Such an increase, if introduced, will have no other 
purpose than the exclusion of the non-autochthonous urban dwellers since the 
reservation of 55% of the seats in a city council serves the purpose of ensuring the 
dominance of the autochthonous communities in the cities, let alone their 
representation. 
 
The constitutionality of the above institutional arrangements is not beyond 
dispute. Urban dwellers with non-autochthonous ethnic background have certain  
individual rights that are protected by the FDRE Constitution that the states cannot 
infringe, even though the former cannot claim group rights, as they do not form a 
distinct ethnic community (Van der Beken, 2014). The FDRE Constitution (Art 38 
(1)) guarantees the right of ‘every Ethiopian national’, regardless of his or her ‘colour, 
race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or 
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other status’ to elect and be elected. The right to election ‘by universal and equal 
suffrage’ is guaranteed to every Ethiopian in all elections, including local elections. 
Therefore, elections, including elections for a city council, are held on the basis of 
this constitutional principle. The national electoral law reiterates the above 
constitutional principles. It defines the requirements of eligibility for voting and 
candidacy in any elections, which relate to citizenship, age and duration of 
residency in a constituency (FDRE Proclamation 532/2007) Art 45). Ethnicity is 
not among the eligibility requirements either for voting or candidacy in all 
elections. As a rule, therefore, ethnic background cannot be a requirement of 
eligibility either to vote or to be a candidate in any elections at any level of 
government. 
 
Indeed, the Constitution (Art 54 (3)) itself reserves 20 seats in Parliament for what 
are considered ethnic minorities. It may thus be interpreted to mandate similar 
arrangements at regional or local level. This provision is, however, aimed at ensuring 
the representation of minority ethnic communities, which otherwise would be 
excluded from any political representation. On the other hand, the reservation over 
50% of city council seats has no other purpose than excluding urban residents with 
non-autochthonous ethnic background making the arrangements constitutionality 
problematic. 
 
With regard to the language requirement, the FDRE Constitution clearly states that one’s 
right to participate in elections, both as a voter or a candidate, cannot be restricted on 
the basis of a language requirement. Proficiency in the working language of a regional 
or local government is, however, found to be constitutional by the House of 
Federation.7 
 
Language Right Urban Residents 
As was mentioned above the southward expansion of the Abyssinian Empire had 
brought about the cultural and linguistic marginalisation of the communities of 
the southern regions. In particular, with the introduction of Amarigna (Amharic) 
as the sole official language of the country, members of the communities of the 
southern regions had no choice but to use the language, or make use of the service 
of an interpreter, to communicate with local rulers or judges. The linguistic 
marginalisation of the communities was more pronounced in the urban areas than 
in the rural areas since the latter served as centres of local and provincial 
administration (Markakis, 2004; Zewide, 2002). 
 
With a view to addressing the cultural marginalisation of the various ethnic 
communities of the country, the Constitution provides equal recognition to all 
languages in the country. It also empowers the ethnic territorial and political units 
to choose their own working languages (FDRE Constitution, 1995 Art 5 (3)). 
Amaregna is constitutionally recognised as the working language of the federal 
government. The language of the dominant ethnic community of the Amhara, Oromia, 
Tigray and Hareri regional states is used as the official language in those respective 
regions. The SNNP, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, having no dominant ethnic 
community, use Amaregna as their working language at regional level. The Afar 
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regional state also uses Amaregna as the working language despite Afarigna being 
recognised in the regional constitution (Art 5) as the official language of the region. In 
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR), several mono-ethnic 
nationality zones, including Sidama, Silte and Hadiya nationality zones, have 
begun using local languages for official purposes (Cohen, 2000; Smith, 2008). 
Afaa-Oromo has also become the working language of the Oromo Nationality Zone in 
the Amhara regional state (Mohammed, 2010). The federal government, the regional 
states, nationality zones and liyu woredas are monolingual in a sense that they use 
only a single language for official purposes. The exception is the Hareri regional 
state, which in its regional constitution (Art 6) has adopted Afaan-Oromo and Hareri 
as official languages of the region. The issue, therefore, is whether the linguistic 
diversity of urban dwellers is catered for in a manner that respects the residents’ 
right to the cities. 
 
The federal cities, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, have already adopted the working 
language of the federal government as their official languages. Moreover, as a rule, 
the working language of a regional state automatically becomes the working 
language of the cities and municipalities located in it. A city or municipality that is 
located within a nationality zone or a liyu woreda that has adopted a working 
language is also expected to adopt that very same working language (Ayele, 2014). 
Despite its multi-ethnic and multi-lingual population, a city is, therefore, expected 
to adopt a single working language—except the city of Harer which is found in 
bilingual region—aligned with the working language of its regional state, nationality 
zone or liyu woredas. They may not adopt working languages that deviate from the 
working language of their nationality zones. Afaan-Oromo has thus become the 
sole working language in several cities in Oromia as is Tigregna in Mekele, the 
capital of the Tigray region. Several nationality zones in SNNP, including Hadya, 
Wolyita, Sidama, have opted to use local languages as their working language 
(Ayele, 2014). 
 
 
Marginalised  communities  have,  therefore,  been  culturally  empowered  since  
their languages have now official status. The institutional set up does not however 
cater for those residents of the cities who are not members of the autochthonous 
communities. The urban dwellers who are not members of the autochthonous 
communities have no legal right to demand the use of an additional language for 
official purposes, even at a city level, regardless of the fact that they are found in 
large number in many cities and municipalities. As Yonatan Fessha (2010, 197) 
states: 
 
[I]ndividuals moving into [other] regions must assimilate. That means Amharic– 
speaking citizens moving to an Oromifa-speaking region have to leave behind any 
prior claim to language protection .. . this has created a problem in some areas 
where an important number of minorities are scattered in the midst of the regionally 
dominant linguistic groups, especially in major urban areas of some of the member 
states. 
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As a result, urban dwellers in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and Somali regional states 
and several nationality zones and liyu woredas in SNNP in terms of the law can only 
communicate with city organs through the official language of the relevant 
regional or sub-regional unit, which may very well be different from the language 
they speak. Yet, they have to write their applications or petitions to city 
administrations in Afaan-Oromo and Somali languages, respectively. Residents of 
the cities in Oromia who cannot write and read Afaan-Oromo are required to have 
their applications or petitions translated into Afaan-Oromo. The same applies to 
urban residents in several nationality zones and liyu woredas in the SNNP that have 
opted to use local languages for official purposes. In all cities in Oromia and Somali 
regional states identity cards, driving licenses, traffic tickets, birth and death 
certificates, and marriage certificates are issued in Afaan-Oromo and Somali 
languages, respectively. The same obtains in several cities of the SNNPR that are 
located in nationality zones that use local languages as own working language. 
 
A further consequence of the adoption of the ‘regional’ language as official language is 
that it is has become near impossible for non-autochthonous urban residents to find 
employment in the civil service organs of cities and municipalities. The working 
language of these organs is the first barrier encountered by urban residents of non-
autochthonous ethnic background who do not  speak the  local language  when looking  
for  jobs in  the cities and municipalities. City administrations in Oromia use Afaan-
Oromo as the sole working language. City residents, who cannot speak, read and 
write Afaan-Oromo, are automatically disqualified from employment in  the  city  
administrations  and  municipalities. As a result, those with non-autochthonous ethnic 
background who worked as teachers or as employee of government officials were fired 
(Teshome, 1999). Graduates of the universities and colleges in these cities, who do 
not belong to autochthonous communities, have little hope of finding employment 
there. Therefore they have no choice but to migrate to Addis Ababa or other regions in 
search of employment. The non-autochthonous residents of cities and municipalities of 
the SNNPR located in nationality zones or liyu woredas that use local languages for 
official purpose face similar problems.8 
 
The same can also be said with respect to the two federals cities, Addis Ababa and 
Dire Dawa, since the federal government has legally adopted Amaregna as the only 
working language of these cities.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  Dire  Dawa  has  a  
significant number of Somali and Oromo residents and that Addis Ababa serves as 
the capital of the Oromia regional state. For instance, the ethnic Somalis in Dire 
Dawa, 24% of the total number of residents of the city, make up a mere 5% of all of 
the civil servants of the city. Yet the Amharas, 20%of the city’s entire residents, 
represent 45%of the city’s civil servant (Midega, 2014). The overrepresentation of the 
Amharas and the under representation of the Somalis in the city’s civil service are 
due to the language policy of the federal government that provides Amaregna the 
privilege of being the only working language of the city (Midega, 2014). 
 
It is important to note that one has no choice but to tolerate some of the 
unfavourable consequences of the language policies described above with relation 
to the regional cities if historically marginalised communities are to be, and feel, 
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culturally empowered. Moreover, the non-autochthonous residents of the cities are 
from diverse ethnic communities. It is thus practically impossible for the cities to 
cater to every urban dweller through their language policies even if they had the 
political will and the necessary legal power to adopt additional working language/s. 
It is often suggested that Amaregna, being the language that is widely spoken 
among urban dwellers, can be used as an additional working language in the 
cities. Such a suggestion is, however, often seen as unacceptable because, given the 
privileged status that Amharic enjoyed in the past, an arrangement of this sort 
would certainly put a hindrance against the development of hitherto marginalised 
languages (Fessha, 2010). 
 
In any case practice shows that the cities are much more accommodative in that 
many cities in the southern regions use Amaregna for some purposes besides the 
working languages of the regional states, nationality zones or liyu woredas within 
which they are found. For instance, it is common to see street signs in many cities 
of Oromia that are written in two, and often, three languages: Afaan-Oromo, 
Amaregna and English. In Adama, Bishoftu, Jimma, etc., government offices, 
business centres and shops put signs that are written in Afaan-Oromo, Amaregna 
and some times, English. Moreover, some of the official documents issued by the 
cities in Oromia are prepared in Afaan-Oromo and Amaregna. For instance, the 
receipt that is prepared by the Oromia Finance and Economic Development Bureau, 
which is also used by the city governments in Oromia regional state for collecting 
taxes and other revenues, is prepared both in Afaan-Oromo and Amaregna. In 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, Amaregna is still retained as the working 
language of the regional government. The nationality zones and liyu woredas in 
these regions have not begun using local languages for official purpose even if 
constitutionally they are entitled to do so. Hence the cities in these regions use 
Amaregna for official purposes (Ayele, 2014). 
 
Education in Cities 
Determining which language or languages are used for education is also a matter that 
is often left to the ethnic-based sub-stat units.  In some cases the education competence 
also includes the power to formulate the educational curriculum in the sub-state unit. 
Control over education matters is left to ethnic territorial units because education is a 
‘central vehicle of cultural transmission’ (Smith, 2008). 
 
As was briefly mentioned above, ethnic communities of the southern regions were 
compelled to abandon their languages and receive education in the Amaregna 
language, an aspect of cultural marginalisation that they historically experienced. The 
federal dispensation seeks to remedy this historic marginalisation. To this effect, the 
FDRE Constitution recognises the right of each ethnic community ‘to speak, write and 
develop its language’ and to receive education in its own language (FDRE 
Constitution, 1995 Art 39 (2)).9 Moreover, it is the policy of the federal government 
to ensure that primary education is offered to each ethnic community either in its 
own language or in the language that the ethnic community chooses. Amaregna is 
simply given as a subject in primary schools of various nationality zones only 
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because it is considered ‘a language of countrywide communication’ (Ministry of 
Education, 1994). 
 
A regional state, a nationality zone or a liyu woreda has the authority to pass a policy 
decision on the language that is to be used in primary schools, while a cities and 
woredas are responsible for building school and hiring teachers (Garcia & Rajkumar, 
2008). It is, however, unclear whether students with non-autochthonous ethnic 
background in the cities and municipalities have the right to receive education in 
their own language. The Gambella Constitution (2002, Art 6 (4)), after recognising the 
right of the ethnic communities of the region to learn in their own language, provides 
that the ‘people in the region have the right to learn in [Amaregna ]’. The term ‘the people 
in the region’ seems to refer to those not belonging to one of the five autochthonous 
ethnic communities of the region. Thus, in this region Amaregna is designated as the 
medium of education in which all students of non-autochthonous ethnic background 
may legally demand to be educated. Hence, cities and municipalities in this region 
seem to be enjoined by the regional constitution to use Amaregna for providing 
primary education to  students  with  non-autochthonous ethnic background. It should 
be noted that Amaregna is designated as the only language of education for all 
students of non-autochthonous ethnic background in the region. Hence, for instance, 
the Oromos in the Gambella City may not, in terms of the regional constitution,  
demand  for  the  establishment  of  public-funded  primary  schools  that provide 
primary education in Afaan-Oromo nor may the Tigrayans demand a school or a 
classroom that offers education in Tigregna. 
 
None of the other regional constitutions deal with the question of whether students 
of non-autochthonous ethnic background are entitled to receive education in a 
language other than the language of the autochthonous community. Thus, it is 
unclear whether the city governments and municipal administrations are 
compelled to offer mother-tongue education to students of non-autochthonous 
ethnic background within their jurisdictions. 
 
The FDRE Constitution provides that ‘[t]he State has the obligation to allocate ever 
increasing resources to provide to the public health, education and other social 
services’. It further adds that ‘[e]very Ethiopian national has the right to equal access 
to publicly funded social services’. The obligation to ensure access to government-
funded service does not exist with reference to communities but with reference to 
‘every Ethiopian’. Based on  these  constitutional  principles,  one  may  argue  that  cities  
and  municipalities, as components of the state, are obliged to ensure mother-tongue 
education for all residing within their territorial jurisdiction. The schools that are run 
by cities and municipalities are funded by the state. Hence, students of non-
autochthonous ethnic background may demand equal access to these state-funded 
schools. Equal access should be read to imply the right to be educated in one’s own 
language (Ayele, 2014). 
 
Another argument is also possible. One may argue equal access to a state-funded 
education does not necessarily imply the right to be educated in one’s own language. It 
simply implies a right to be enrolled in the existing schools, regardless of the language 
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the schools use to provide primary education. Students of non-autochthonous ethnic 
background thus have no right to a mother-tongue education, since the FDRE 
Constitution does not enjoin the regional states to accommodate them with 
mother-tongue education. It may then follow that cities are not required to 
provide mother-tongue education to students of non-autochthonous ethnic 
background. 
 
In any case, it is clear that those with non-autochthonous ethnic background lack a 
firm legal basis to demand education in a language other than that of the dominant 
ethnic community of the particular regional or sub-regional unit. Indeed one cannot 
expect every city to provide mother-tongue education to all of its residents. The 
cities do not have the necessary resources and manpower to do so. Even more 
doing so is simply impractical having in mind ethnic diversity urban dwellers. 
However, it is encouraging to note that several cities in the southern regions are 
accommodating students with non-autochthonous ethnic background with education 
in Amaregna. A number of cities in Oromia regional state have established separate 
schools or separate classes in Amaregna for non-Oromo communities (Smith, 
2008). For instance in Bishoftu, all of the 14 public schools have separate classes for 
providing education in Amaregna. There are also more than 32 private schools 
providing education in Amaregna for students from the non-Oromo communities 
(Amensisa, 2012). Similarly, there are two public schools and two other private 
schools in Ambo providing education in both Afaan-Oromo and Amaregna 
(Amensisa, 2012). Similar trend is seen in the SNNPR where schools in the 
capitals of nationality zones and liyu woredas use Amaregna as the language of 
instruction for primary education (Smith 2008, 226). In the capitals of mono-
ethnic nationality zones Amaregna is used for education along with the language of 
the dominant ethnic community of the nationality zone. 
 
Amaregna is, for instance, used alongside sidamigna in primary schools of Hawassa 
city administration that is the capital of Sidama nationality zone as well as of the 
SNNPR. It is also used alongside gamogna in Arba-Minch, the capital of Gamo-Gofa 
Nationality Zone. In Sodo, the capital of Wolayita nationality zone, Amaregna and 
wolayitegna are used in primary schools. In Hossana, the capital of Hadiya 
nationality zone Amaregna is used along with hadiyisa while in Dilla, the capital 
of Gedeo nationality zone, gedeofaa is used for the same purpose. In Bench-Maji 
zone and South Omo nationality zones have opted to use Amaregna for education in 
primary schools. Moreover, the Gurage nationality zone and the Alaba liyu woreda in 
SNNPR have opted to using Amaregna for school and official purposes (Cohen, 
2000; Fessha, 2010). In these nationality zones, students of non-autochthonous 
ethnic background can receive education in Amaregna. 
 
Conclusion 
For historical reasons, most cities in Ethiopia, especially those in the southern 
regions, have multi-ethnic and multi-lingual urban residents. The manner in which 
the communities in the cities are organised had thus less to do with ethnic affinity 
than with economic logic. However, with the introduction of the country’s ethnic 
federalism in 1995, the cities, with the exception of two federal cities, have become 
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enclosed within, and become the competences of, ethnically organised regional and 
sub-regional territorial and political units. 
 
The Ethiopian ethnic federal system follows the rule of territoriality on matters of 
political representation, language and education, with little or no institutional 
mechanism for accommodation of urban residents not belonging to the dominant 
ethnic community of the relevant regional or sub-regional units. Thus, there are no 
special schemes to ensure the political representation of non-autochthonous 
communities in the Ethiopian cities and municipalities. On the contrary, the 
ethnically organised regions within which the cities fall have introduced legal 
measures that have the effect of systematically limiting the democratic 
participation of non-autochthonous communities. The cities also have no legal 
duty to accommodate the linguistic diversity of their residents. Hence urban residents 
not belonging to the dominant ethnic communities of the regional and sub-regional 
units have no legal right to receive public services and education in their own 
languages. 
 
In practice cities seem to take into consideration the ethnic diversity of their residents 
in the manner they provide services, despite lacking explicit institutional 
arrangement to this effect. Many cities are in practice bi-lingual in a sense that they 
use the language of the dominant ethnic community of the regional or the sub-
regional unit along with Amaregna for some purposes, even though legally only the 
former is recognised as the working language. The cities also establish separate 
schools or separate classes for the purpose of providing primary education. 
 
It is suggested that the excessive limitations on the political representation of urban 
dwellers of non-autochthonous ethnic background need to be reconsidered.  Such  limit- 
ations, needless to say, are against their right to the cities and contrary to the 
constitutional stipulations that guarantee everyone’s right to elect and be elected, 
regardless of one’s ethnic identity. Indeed affirmative measures are needed to empower 
those communities who were marginalised as the direct result of the establishment of 
many of the urban settlements. This can be achieved, for instance, through the 
reservation of a maximum of 50% of the seats in a city council for the autochthonous 
communities. Exceeding this serves no purpose but the complete and unconstitutional 
exclusion of those with non-autochthonous ethnic background. 
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Notes 
1. The Constitution provides that the right to self-determination of each ethnic 
community finds expression in the ability of the community to exercise self-
governance over the territory it inhabits (FDRE Constitution, 1995 Art 39 (3)). It 
further provides that the boundaries of the constituent units of the federation are 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
18 
 
demarcated ‘on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of 
the people’ (FDRE Constitution, 1995 Art 46 (2)). 
2. The regional states are Afar, Amhara, Beinshangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Hareri, 
Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region, Somali and Tigray. 
FDRE Constitution (1995) 47 (1). 
3. These regions are Afar, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region 
(SNNPR), Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Amhara regions. 
4. There are 63 ethnic communities that are territorially concentrated ethnic 
communities in Ethiopia. See Negarit Gazeta of the Ethiopian Transitional 
Government: A Proclamation to provide for the establishment of national regional 
self-governments (No. 7 1992). 
5. The seat of the central throne moved from one region to the other depending 
on the regional ruler who asserted power. For instance, Gonder was the seat of the 
throne until power shifted to Showa when Emperor Menilik II ascended to the throne. 
What is remarkable is that the provincial ruler sought  to control the centre; hardly ever 
did they seek to break away from it. 
6.  It should also be noted here that a resident of a city who is autochthonous to a 
particular region may be considered as a migrant and treated as such if he or she is non-
autochthonous to the sub-regional unit within which the city is found. For instance, one 
can consider a Sidama resident of the town of Sodo, the capital of the Wolaita nationality 
zone, as migrant despite the fact that he or she is considered as an autochthonous 
resident of the region. The same can be said to a Wolayita who lives in Hosana, the capital 
of Hadiya nationality zone. 
7.  The constitutionality of the language requirement was at issue during the 2000 
national and regional elections. Some candidates were disqualified from running for 
election since they did not speak any of the languages autochthonous communities the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. The working language of the region was, however, 
Amaregna, which the individuals were conversant. The matter was taken to the House of 
Federation, the second chamber of the national parliament, which under the FDRE 
Constitution is empowered to resolve constitutional disputes (see FDRE Constitution 
(1995) Art 62 (1)). The HoF decided that while the requirement of being conversant in 
local language is unconstitutional, the requirement of being conversant in working 
language of a regional states or sub-regional unit was constitutional. 
8.  Moreover, it is often alleged those with non-autochthonous ethnic background are 
discriminated against even if they have the necessary language proficiency, ‘simply 
because they belong to ethnic groups other than those predominant in the region’ or sub-
regional unit (Teshome, 1999). They are discriminated against even in the cities that have 
not adopted local languages as their working language (Berhanu, 2007). 
9.  The Gambella Constitution, for instance, expressly provides that each of the ethnic 
communities of the region has the right to learn in their own language. Likewise, the 
Benishangul-Gumuz regional Constitution recognises the right of the ethnic communities 
of the region to receive education either in their own language or in the language of their 
choice. Gambela Regional State Constitution (2002) Art 6 (3); Benishangul-Gumuz 
Regional Constitution (2002) 6 (3). 
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